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NOTES AND COMMENTS
REEXAMINATION OF MARYLAND POLICY CONCERNING
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE STRIKES
The unique position held by public employees in labor has
traditionally precluded public employee strikes. Maryland, as
well as other jurisdictions, has adhered to this practice. How-
ever, the expansion of the government into many non-critical
roles diminishes the need for this policy. The author suggests
that Maryland review its attitude toward public sector strikes
and adopt the view of several other jurisdictions which allow
such strikes.
INTRODUCTION
The growth of public employee organizations and the corresponding
increase of public sector strikes has initiated an extensive exploration of
public employee policies at all levels of government.' Many State
legislatures have addressed the issue of public employee rights, and
while the majority has advocated some form of collective negotiations
between public employees and public employers, most have determined
that the use of the strike weapon is not a right inherent to employees in
the public sector.2
This philosophy was reflected in 1968 by the Maryland Task Force
on Public Employee Labor Relations. In accordance with traditional
thinking, the Task Force proposed a public labor relations policy for
Maryland which included the right to collective bargaining, but which
denied the use of the strike as a tool for such collective bargaining.3 In
its thirteenth recommendation, the committee stated:
The Task Force recognizes that there are two views concern-
ing work stoppages among public employees, one of which
advocates the absolute prohibition of any work stoppages or
any other concerted interferences by employees with the op-
eration of a public service or function; the second of which
advocates a limited right to strike among groups of public
employees engaged in work which has been described as "non-
critical." Both views accept the proposition that no strikes
should be permitted where the health and safety of the general
1. See Goldberg, Changing Policies in Public Employee Labor Relations, MONTHLY LAB.
REV. 5 (July 1970).
2. See Goldberg, Public Employee Developments in 1971, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 56, 63-66
(Jan. 1972).
3. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE LABOR RELATIONS, REPORT AND RECOM-
DATIONS, Dec. 23, 1968, reprint in GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT No. 278, at
AA-3 (1969) [hereinafter cited as GERR No. 278].
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public is endangered and that, therefore, policemen and fire-
men, among others should not have the right to strike or engage
in such concerted activities as described above. The statute
should explicitly affirm the existing powers of the Courts to
enjoin illegal strikes and should also make clear that its prohibi-
tions are not designed to limit any inherent judicial power. The
statute should also explicitly affirm the employing agency's
existing authority to discipline or discharge employees engaged
4in such strikes....
The Task Force, therefore, stopped short of recommending a blanket
prohibition of strikes by public employees. However, its decision in this
area was not unanimous. Three panel members dissented, stating "that
all work stoppages should be absolutely prohibited in the public sec-
tor."'  It was their belief that "the public servant has a unique
employment responsibility substantially unlike that of his counterpart
in the private sector in that the services he renders usually cannot be
obtained elsewhere nor is the citizenry able to seek that service outside
the governmental apparatus." 6
The only legislative action taken since the time of the Task Force's
recommendations is still pending.7 The Maryland policy, therefore, in
relation to these strikes, remains as most recently stated in Bennett v.
Gravelle.8 In that case, the United States District Court of Maryland
held that under Maryland law, absent an authorizing statute, a public
employee has no right to strike. 9
It is the purpose of this comment to suggest that a limited right to
strike among certain groups of public employees is a more adequate and
feasible solution to the problem area of public employee strikes, and
that such a view should be accepted in Maryland as well as in other
jurisdictions.
BACKGROUND-THE SOVEREIGNTY THEORY
Advocates of the "no-strike" view have commonly argued the "gov-
ernment-employer, as the ultimate repose of all legitimate societal
power, cannot and should not be opposed by the countervailing power
4. Id. at AA-7, 8.
5. Id. at AA-7 n. 12.
6. Id.
7. To date, at least one member of the Maryland House of Delegates has advocated, contrary
to the Task Force's recommendations, that certain public strikes should be allowed. Dele-
gate Ruben has recently introduced a bill concerning public employment relations which
would allow the right to strike if collective bargaining processes have been exhausted and
if the state courts determine that the strike does not create a "present danger or threat
to the health, safety or welfare of the public." H.B. 47, Md. Gen. Ass., 1974 Sess.,
§ 115(c).
8. 323 F. Supp. 203 (D. Md. 1971).
9. Id. at 208.
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of labor unions."' 0 This right of the sovereign was recognized at
common law and is still widely accepted in most American jurisdic-
tions.' '
It is often argued that public employees serve the public welfare and
not a private purpose, and that allowing them to strike is allowing them
to deny the authority of the government.' 2 Similarly, it is claimed that
an organized strike brought to enforce the demands of a union of
government employees contravenes the principle that it is the duty of
every government employee to do his part to make the government
function as efficiently and economically as possible.' '
The sovereignty theory, however, hardly a viable one in modern
society, becomes increasingly questionable with enlarging and wide-
stretching governmental activities. "The huge growth of government
and its expansion into new 'non-essential' services has produced basic
changes in thought which make the foundations of any absolute no-
tions of sovereignty obsolete .... ,, Notwithstanding the expansion of
the government to "non-essential" services,' ' the Maryland Task Force
maintained the basic idea of sovereignty.' 6 The dissenters strongly
believed that those chosen to bear the public trust are held accountable
and must provide adequate government or face removal.' "
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
EMPLOYEES-THE FALLACIES
Many labor experts contend that there are essential differences in the
public and private sectors which justify the strike prohibition in the
10. Edwards, The Developing Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, 10 DuQ. L. REv.
357, 359 (1972).
11. See, e.g., Anderson Fed'n of Teachers, Local 519 v. School City of Anderson, 252 Ind.
558. 251 N.E.2d 15 (1969); City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers' Guild, 100 N.H.
507, 131 A.2d 59 (1957); Board of Educ. v. New Jersey Educ. Ass'n, 53 N.J. 29, 247 A.2d
867 (1968).
12. Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951).
13. City of Aloca v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 760, 203 Tenn. 12, 20, 308
S.W.2d 476, 479 (1957), citing Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn.
269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951).
14. Edwards, supra note 10, at 360.
15. Non-essential government services are those such as streets, parks, education, housing,
welfare and general administration. These services are termed "non-essential" because
strikes in these areas can be tolerated for indefinite duration without endangering the
public health, safety and welfare. Id.
16. In the opening paragraphs of its report, the Task Force stated:
The Task Force believes that while there are some similarities between public
and private labor relations, there are also inherent differences. These differences
arise from the nature of the public employer as a sovereign charged with obliga-
tions to all the people. Its authority stems from fundamental constitutional ar-
rangements. Public employers cannot abdicate their legislative discretion. Both
the public employer and public employees are employees of the government of
the people and owe allegiance to that government. It should be the aim of every
public employee to do his or her part to perform their government function as ef-
ficiently and economically as possible with uninterrupted service to all the people.
GERR No. 278, at AA-4.
17. Id. at AA-7, 8 n.12.
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former and allow strikes in the latter. They claim that the pressure
applied by private employee strikes is economic while the pressure
applied by public employee strikes is solely political. These theorists
justify private employee strikes, therefore, because the public can turn
to alternative sources for their economic needs. Conversely, public
employee strikes cannot be justified because the public cannot turn to
alternative sources for their public needs.' 8
This view assumes that the demand for government services is in-
elastic,' 9 and that substitution for these services is impossible. It also
assumes that there is a cross-elasticity of demand 2 0 in the private
sector. However, the advocates of this position fail to realize that it is
based on a perfect competition model. 2 ' A more pragmatic viewpoint
admits that while there are many private sector products for which
substitutes can be found, a strike in any one private industry may very
well deprive the market of a product for which there is no viable
18. This theory is advanced by R. Theodore Clark, Jr.:
In the private sector, employees sell a product for which there are generally
alternative sources of supply. The purpose of a private sector strike is to bring
economic pressure on the employer by depriving the employer of sales and prof-
its.... Rather than bringing economic pressure on the employer, the purpose of
a strike in the public sector is to bring political pressure on the public employer,
the pressure being generated by the recipients of the public service which is
halted by the strike. Once this fundamental distinction is understood, it should
become clear that there is no fundamental justification for permitting strikes by
public employees.
Clark, Public Employee Strikes: Some Proposed Solutions, 23 LAB L.J. 111, 115-16
(1972).
It was pursuant to this line of thinking that the Taylor Committee recommended to
New York's Governor Rockefeller that public strikes be prohibited. In their report to the
Governor the Committee stated:
Careful thought about the matter shows conclusively, we believe, that while
the right to strike normally performs a useful function in the private enterprise
sector (where relative economic power is the final determinant in the making of
private agreements), it is not compatible with the orderly functioning of our
democratic form of representative government (in which relative political power
is the final determinant).
GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON PUBLic EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT at 18-19 (New
York, 1966).
19. When used in this context, inelastic means insensitive to change. In other words, the de-
mand for government services will not change if government employees go on strike. For
example, if firemen go on strike, the public's need or demand for those services will be
the same as it was before the strike; there are no substitutes for their services. The public
cannot rely on other services (i.e., police or school teachers) for protection against fire.
Therefore, there is no limit as to how far a public employee may go before he gets his de-
mands. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMics 359-64 (8th. ed. 1970).
20. When used in this context, cross elasticity of demand means that products in the private
sector are sensitive to change. In other words, if private employees go on strike, an inevi-
table result is the increase in the cost of the goods they produce, inviting substitution for
that good. For example, if X auto company goes on strike, and the union's demands cause
the cost to produce X's car to increase, the price of X's car will go up. Assuming that
monopolies are unlawful, the customer will buy a competitor's car which is less costly.
This means lower sales for X, and eventually lower employment. This analysis concludes
that there is a limit to how far a private employee will go, because the end result may be
the loss of employment for him. Id.
21. When used in this context, the perfect competition model assumes that any given private
industry has many producers who produce identical products. Id. at 67.
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substitute. On the other hand, it cannot be argued that every govern-
ment service is without a substitute.2 2
The economic implications that accompany any strike are not lim-
ited to the private sector. While most public services are provided free
of charge, strikes in the areas which are not free (i.e., water, sewage,
etc.) may have the same effect on the public employer as do strikes
against the private employer. It must also be realized that striking
employees in both the public and private sectors are affected similarly
economically. "Wages lost due to strikes are as important to public
employees as they are to employees in the private sector." 2 3
In observing this distinction, Chief Justice DeBruler of the Indiana
Supreme Court, advanced one of the strongest arguments in favor of
certain public employee strikes in his dissenting opinion in Anderson
Federation of Teachers v. School City of Anderson.2 " He argued that
in order to justify the strike prohibition against every public employee,
it must be shown that any public employee strike is more disruptive
than a strike by private employees.2 S In concluding that a such a
showing could not be made, Chief Justice DeBruler questioned whether
thee would be any difference in impact between a strike by public
employees of a public utility and a strike by employees of a private
utility.2 6 To further advance the arguments proposed by those who
advocate a limited right to strike, the Chief Justice contended that it
was obvious that some private employee strikes were far more destruc-
tive than some public sector strikes.2 7 In the final analysis it is naive to
think that every strike by any public employee will upset the whole
operation of government.2 '
With these thoughts in mind let us now look at the real situations
which have resulted from the application of the differing theories.
22. One theorist explains:
In the real world, many factors operate to distort the perfect substitutability
of goods upon which this argument relies.. .. In addition it can be argued that
the demand for government services is not so inelastic as might ordinarily be as-
sumed. No constitutional prohibition prevents the government from cutting back
or eliminating some services-or deciding to subcontract others....
Edwards, supra note 10, at 362.
23. Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE
L.J. 418, 425 (1970).
24. Anderson Fed'n of Teachers, Local 519 v. School City of Anderson, 252 Ind. 558, 251
N.E.2d 15 (1969).
25. Id. at 568, 251 N.E.2d at 20.
26. Id. at 569, 251 N.E.2d at 21.
27. It seems obvious to me that a strike by some private employees would be far
more disruptive of the society than the peaceful teachers' strike involved in this
case, e.g., the truck drivers who deliver milk to the cities, the factory workers
who work in the defense plants, construction workers who work in the defense
plants, construction workers on missile and space launching sites, agriculture
workers....
Id.
28. "Does the majority seriously believe that a strike by employees of municipal golf courses
would result in anarchy? What about city parking lot attendants? What about referees
at the high school basketball games?" Id. at 570, 251 N.E.2d at 21.
1974l
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LESSON ONE-NEW YORK'S TAYLOR LAW
While no Maryland statute specifically prohibits public employee
strikes (one exception being a statute concerning public school teach-
ers2 ), the common law prohibition against such strikes, which is
operative in Maryland,3 0 can be analogized to the New York statute
which specifically denies this right to its public employees.
New York's Taylor Law, 3 ' enacted April 21, 1967, granted public
employees the right to join employee organizations and to negotiate
collectively with public employers. The law, however, prohibited strikes
by public employees, and in lieu of allowina strike activity set up the
Public Employee Relations Board (PERB) to assist in fie resolution of
disputes between public employers and emp,-3y.' organizations. This
legislation, although in accord with that of ot"'er jurisdictions,3 2 re-
sulted in litigation which challenged the constitutionality of the statute.
Among the leading cases was New York v. DeLury3 " where the defend-
ant union contended that the statute was unconstitutional because it
deprived the defendants of due process of law. In rejecting this conten-
tion, the Court of Appeals of New York stated that neither the
fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution nor the bill of rights
of the state constitution (art. 1) grants to any individual any absolute
right to strike.3 In quoting the general rule laid down by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Local 232, UAW v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board,3 " the court went on to say that the state, in
governing its internal affairs, had the power to prohibit any strike if the
prohibition was reasonably calculated to achieve a valid state policy in
an area which was open to state regulation.3 6
Similarly, in Zeluck v. Board of Education,3  the Supreme Court of
Westchester County, New York, held that the statute did not violate
equal protection of the laws, nor did it infringe upon the teacher's
rights of free association and speech. The main argument advanced by
the Federation of Teachers in Zeluck was that their right of association
was made meaningless by the fact that the school board was both
29. MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, § 160 (1969).
30. Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203, 208 (D. Md. 1971).
31. N.Y. CIv. SEP. LAW §§ 200-12 (McKinney 1973).
32. For example, Michigan's Hutchinson Act provides:
No person holding a position by appointment or employment in the govern-
ment of the State of Michigan, or in the government of any 1 or more political
subdivisions thereof, or in the public school service, or in any public or special
district, or in the service of any authority, commission or board, or in any other
branch of the public service ... shall strike.
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(2) (1968).
33. 23 .Y.2d 175, 243 N.E.2d 128 (1968), application denied, 23 N.Y.2d 766, 244 N.E.2d 472
(1968), appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 455 (1969), rehearing denied, 396 U.S. 872 (1969).
34. Id. at 181, 243 N.E.2d at 131.
35. 336 U.S. 245, 259 (1949).
36. 23 N.Y.2d at 182, 243 N.E.2d at 131.
37. 62 Misc. 2d 274, 307 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1970).
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negotiator and ultimate arbiter of the disputes arising out of negotia-
tion.3 " In answering this argument, which, incidentally, is an adamant
contention of pro-striking advocates, the court maintained that proce-
dures set forth in the Taylor Law were designed to bring about the
settlement of disputes.' '
Notwithstanding such rulings, strikes by New York's public em-
ployees continued, and the procedures set forth in the law to bring
about the settlement of disputes were not working. Both unions and
employers continually rejected the recommendations of the fact-finding
panel.4 0 The rejection rate for reports was thirty per cent.4' I
In search for a solution to the continuing public employee strikes,
the New York legislature aggravated the problem by amending the
Taylor Law on March 4, 1969. The amended version imposed penalties
directly on the unions, subjecting them to unlimited fines and loss of
check-off for unlimited periods. Also, in contrast to the 1967 law, the
1969 amendment provided specific penalties for individual strikers-
striking employees would lose two days pay for each day off the job,
and would be placed on probation without tenure for one year.4 2
Notwithstanding this imposition of penalties on both the unions and
their members, the strikes continued. In 1969 New York experienced
fifteen work stoppages, which involved 2,390 workers and resulted in
7,140 idle man-days. 4 I In 1970, the number of work stoppages
increased to 36. These strikes involved 65,930 workers and resulted in
394,780 idle man-days.4 4 Although the figures declined in 1971, the
number of stoppages in that year were still substantial. During that
period there were 19 strikes, involving 32,900 workers, and resulting in
136,300 idle man-days.
The cold fact remains that the Taylor Law has not prevented strikes
and has not solved the public employee dilemma. Theodore W. Kheel,
38. Id. at 275, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
39. Id.
40. One theorist observed:
The framers of the Taylor Law apparently assumed that the unions would be
the only ones to reject recommendations and that the pressure of public opinion
would eventually induce them to accept the findings of a distinguished panel. But
experience has proven that public agencies also reject recommendations and that
neither employers nor employees are forced to agreement by critical editorials or
public dismay. In the famous sanitation strike in February 1968, Mayor Lindsey
rejected as "blackmail" a panel's recommendation for an additional increase of
fifty cents a week and was widely praised for this action. The fact is that either
side can reject recommendations with impunity, leaving open the question of how
the dispute is then to be settled.
Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 931, 934 (1969).
41. See GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT No. 249, EL-4 (June 17, 1968).
42. Appears, as amended, in GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT No. 288 at F-1
(March 17, 1969).
43. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, GOVERNMENT WORK STOPPAGES, 1960, 1969 and 1970, SUM-
MARY REPORT 8 (1971).
44. Id.
45. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, GOVERNMENT WORK STOPPAGES IN 1971 (March 1973).
1974]
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one of the strongest opponents of the Taylor Law from the outset,
sums up the situation as follows:
It would be unfair to place upon the legal machinery the sole
responsibility for these interruptions of critical services on
which the welfare of New York depends. But the fact remains
that the machinery-including the prohibition on strikes with
attendant penalties and the fact-finding boards with their power
to make recommendations-did not work to settle these dis-
putes or stop the strikes, slowdowns, or threats. In fact it is
probable that the Taylor Law exacerbated these conflicts. For
one thing, it made subversive a form of conduct society en-
dorses for private workers. It encouraged unions to threaten to
strike to achieve the bargaining position participants in collec-
tive bargaining must possess. It made the march to jail a mar-
tyr's procession and a badge of honor for union leaders. It
hardened positions by calling upon representative organizations
to declare publicly their acceptance or rejection of fact-finders
recommendations. In simple point of fact, it did not and is not
likely to work as a mechanism for resolving conflicts in public
employment relations through joint determination, whether
called collective bargaining or collective negotiations.' 6
LESSON TWO-PENNSYLVANIA'S PUBLIC EMPLOYE 4 7
RELATIONS ACT
Maryland's neighboring state of Pennsylvania has enacted legislation
allowing public employes the right to strike. In order to adequately
consider Maryland's position, an inquiry into the Pennsylvania law is
necessitated.
In 1968, pursuant to a directive by Pennsylvania's Governor Schaefer
to assess the then present public employe relations law, the Hickman
Commission reported:
The 1947 Act forbids any and all strikes by public employ-
es. Twenty years of experience has taught us that such a policy
is unreasonable and unenforceable, particularly when coupled
with ineffective or non-existent collective bargaining. It is based
upon a philosophy that one may not strike against the sover-
eign. But today's sovereign is engaged not only in government
but in a great variety of other activities. The consequences of a
strike by a policeman are very different from those of a gar-
dener in a public park.4 8
46. Kheel, supra note 40, at 936.
47. The Pennsylvania legislature has adopted this shortened spelling.
48. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVISE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYE LAW OF PENNSYLVANIA-REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS, JUNE 1968, in GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT No. 251,
at E-2 (1968) [hereinafter cited as GERR No. 251].
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However, the Commission qualified its statement by contending that
no one should have the right to strike unless all collective bargaining
procedures have been exhausted.4" Likewise, the Commission believed
that public employes should have no right to strike if the health,
safety or welfare of the public were endangered. It recommended that
the appropriate courts should be empowered to enjoin any strike of
public employes once that danger point had been reached.5 0
Realizing that not all public employe strikes endanger the public
health, safety and welfare, the Committee stated:
[W] here collective bargaining procedures have been exhausted
and public health, safety or welfare is not endangered, it is
inequitable and unwise to prohibit strikes. The period that a
strike can be permitted will vary from situation to situation. A
strike of gardeners in a public park could be tolerated longer
than a strike of garbage collectors. And a garbage strike might
be permissible for a few days but not indefinitely, and for
longer in one season than another.' I
In contending that the collective bargaining process would be
strengthened by recognizing the right to strike, the Commission con-
cluded that a limited and carefully defined right to strike would operate
as a safety valve that would in fact prevent strikes.5 2
In accepting the Hickman Commissions's recommendations, the
1970 Session of the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Public Em-
ploye Relations Act (hereinafter called Act 195).' Act 195 gives the
employes of Pennsylvania the right to bargain collectively and a
limited right to strike. Before the strike can be called, however, certain
bargaining procedures must be exhausted.5
Not all public employes are covered by the act. Realizing the in-
herent danger posed by strikes by firemen and policemen, the legisla-
ture excluded them from Act 195's coverage. These groups are covered
separately and have only the right to bargain collectively. ' Similarly,
guards at prisons and mental hospitals, and employes involved with the
necessary functioning of the courts were also excluded.5 6
Despite the Hickman Commission's feeling that the law would in fact
prevent strikes, it was inevitable that certain public employes would
test the strength of Act 195. In 1971, Pennsylvania witnessed a total of
87 work stoppages. These stoppages involved 36,100 workers and
resulted in 257,800 idle man-days.5 ' While these figures evidenced the
49. Id.
50. Id. at E-3.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1101.101-.2301 (Supp. 1973).
54. Id. § 1101.1003.
55. Id. § 217.1.
56. Id. § 1101.1001.
57. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, GOVERNMENT WORK STOPPAGES IN 1971 (March 1973).
1974]
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largest amount of strike activity of any state,' ' it must be noted that
Pennsylvania's public employes had, even prior to the enactment of
Act 195, a history of substantial striking activity.' 9
Most of the strikes were called by the public school teachers.6 0 This
is understandable when one realizes that school teachers are among the
most highly organized of public employes.6 1 The constitutions of
both the American Federation of Teachers and the National Education
Association have no reference to strikes, but the former association
goes on the record as supporting stoppages as of 1963.62
While it must be admitted that a firm reason for the strikes was a
demand for better economic security, a good deal of the strikes can be
attributed to the different interpretations given to the act by both
employers and employees. For example, one section of Act 195 states
that employers shall not be required to bargain over matters of inherent
managerial policy while at the same time requires employers to meet
and discuss on policy matters affecting wages, hours and terms and
conditions of employment as well as the impact thereon upon request
by public employe representatives.6 3 Arguments arose as to what was
and what was not a proper subject for bargaining.6 4
Despite the strike figures, one analyst has concluded that Act 195
has proved to be a realistic and workable law.6 s He contends that the
58. The closest state was Ohio where public employees do not have the right to strike. Dur-
ing the same period Ohio had 40 stoppages, involving 7,100 men, resulting in 25,200 idle
man-days. Id.
59. In the four years preceeding the enactment of Act 195 there had been a combined total of
91 stoppages, involving 81,730 workers resulting in 238,660 idle man-days. 1967-68 fig-
ures: BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, 1958-68, REPORT
No. 348, at 15-17 (1970). 1969-70 figures: BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, GOVERNMENT
WORK STOPPAGES, 1960, 1969 and 1970, SUMMARY REPORT 8 (1971).
60. One analyst of Act 195 observed:
During the first year, the greatest scope of action by far under it was by the public
school teachers. By Thanksgiving of 1971, a total of 64 school strikes were called,
keyed to demands for increased salary schedules, broader fringe benefits, and
wider participation of the school system.
Alderfer, The 1971 Pennsylvania Public School Strikes, 23 LAB. L.J. 41 (1972).
61. The American Federation of Teachers increased its membership more than 250% between
1962 and 1972 from 71,000 to 249,000. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NEWS, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (Aug. 22, 1973).
As of May, 1968, the National Education Association had a membership of well over
1,000,000. Ross, Public Employee Unions and the Right to Strike, MONTHLY LAB. REV.
14, 16 (March 1969).
62. Ross, supra note 61, at 16.
63. 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1101.702 (Supp. 1973).
64. Alderfer notes:
While the teachers put forth impressive lists of non-economic demands, most
of the school boards stood firm against including such demands in their negotia-
tions as bargainable, but in some cases teachers won certain rights in matters of
"inherent managerial policy." In fact, in many strikes the teachers claimed that
the non-economic items were paramount over the economic demands in the nego-
tiations. As a result, there was a great deal of confusion.
Alderfer, supra note 60, at 46.
65. Schmidman, Collective Bargaining in Pennsylvania's Public Sector: The First Three
Months, 24 LAB. L.J. 755 (1973).
[Vol. 3
Public Employee Strikes
incidence of strikes has been over-emphasized, and points to the decline
in the number of strikes as collective bargaining in the public sector
becomes more sophisticated. 6 6
THE SITUATION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Other jurisdictions are faced with the same problem. In Michigan, for
example, despite the provisions of the "Hutchinson Act" 6" which
prohibits public sector strikes, there were 28 work stoppages in
1971.6 a In the previous two years, Michigan's public employees led the
nation in strikes with 129.69
Similarly, in New Jersey, where the Employer-Employee Relations
Act provides for mediation and fact-finding to resolve impasses, but
does not allow strikes, 7 0 there were 23 strikes in 1971.71 In 1969 and
197.0, the public employees of the state were involved in 41 strikes.7 2
Ohio, also, has a history of public sector disputes. Apparently highly
susceptible to public employee strikes, that state witnessed 40 stop-
pages in 1971.' 3 Ohio was also among the highest in the previous two
years with a total of 119 strikes.7 4 All of this activity took place
notwithstanding Ohio's explicit prohibition against strikes. 7 s
It would be fair to state, however, that not all states are subject to
such a high amount of striking activity. In 1971 sixteen states experi-
enced no stoppages at all, and ten more were the victims of only one
public sector strike. 7 6 However, since strikes are either expressly pro-
hibited or prohibited via common law in most of these states, 7  we
66. The incidence of strikes under Act 195 has been relatively minimal and cer-
tainly overemphasized.... It would appear that the novelty of collective bargain-
ing and the inexperience of the negotiators played a major role in the incidence of
strikes during the first two and one-half years of the Public Employe Relations
Act. The decline in the number of strikes may be expected to continue as negoti-
ators become more accustomed to collective bargaining and bilateral decision
making.
Id. at 762.
67. MIH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(2) (1968).
68. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, GOVERNMENT WORK STOPPAGES IN 1971 (March 1973).
69. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, GOVERNMENT WORK STOPPAGES, 1960, 1969 and 1970, SUM-
MARY REPORT 8 (1971).
70. N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
71. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, GOVERNMENT WORK STOPPAGES IN 1971 (March 1973).
72. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, GOVERNMENT WORK STOPPAGES, 1960, 1969 and 1970, SUM-
MARY REPORT 8 (1971).
73. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, GOVERNMENT WORK STOPPAGES IN 1971 (March 1973).
74. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, GOVERNMENT WORK STOPPAGES, 1960, 1969 and 1970, SUM-
MARY REPORT 8 (1971).
75. OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.02 (1973).
76. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, GOVERNMENT WORK STOPPAGES IN 1971 (March 1973).
77. To date, five states have enacted legislation giving certain public employees a limited
right to strike. ALAS. STAT. § 23.40.200(d) (1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12 (1972); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 41-2209 (Supp. 1973); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1101.1003 (Supp. 1973); 21
VT. STAT. ANN. § 1730 (Supp. 1973).
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must ask the question as to whether or not these jurisdictions are
properly approaching the problem.
WHY HAVE THE RIGHT TO STRIKE?
The main reason why public employee strikes are prohibited is
because they are said to endanger the public health, safety and welfare.
Public employee strikes at common law did endanger the public health,
safety and welfare, and in many instances can do so today. It is,
however, in those areas where the government has expanded itself into
a "non-critical" position that public sector strikes should be allowed.
Because of the many "non-critical" roles played by the government
today the public health, safety and welfare are not endangered by every
strike. If this problem no longer exists, then there is no reason why
every public employee strike should be prohibited. 8 Only those strikes
that result in a genuine threat to the public should be banned." 9
Conversely, one of the claimed reasons why private employee strikes
are permissible is because they do not endanger the public health,
safety and welfare. This latter generalization is just as invalid as the
former, yet both are accepted. However, while many jurists have
followed the rule, several others have spoken out against its injustice. In
Rankin v. Shanker,8 o Judge Keating of the New York Court of Appeals
observed in his dissent that:
[E] mployees of private utilities have the power to plunge one
of the great cities of the world into total darkness or complete
silence.... [E] mployees of privately owned railroads and ship-
ping lines have the power to deprive the residents of that city of
vital food and fuel .... [P] rivate sanitation workers, who carry
78. One observer comments:
Whatever impasse resolutions are adopted, a limited right to strike should be
granted to public employees engaged in non-essential services. The right to strike
has become a fundamental part of the American labor movement and, both for
psychological and economic reasons, it should not be abridged without cause. In
non-essential services, a strike may be inconvenient (but certainly no more in-
convenient than a strike by electrical or telephone company employees). This
inconvenience should not produce a perversion of the political process and the
public outcry over such a strike should not be critical, if by definition, the ser-
vices are non-essential. Indeed, such a strike may be needed by this class of em-
ployees to make their demands heard in a political arena beseiged by a plethora
of organized interest groups. Such a strike is not likely to disrupt the government
process any more than the pressure of a lobby, to which it may be likened.
Edwards, supra note 10, at 381-82.
79. Two close followers of the public employee movement have admitted this fact: "The
emergency dispute problem does not compel a complete ban on strikes. Many public
employee strikes are not a danger to health and safety, at least not immediately. And
while non-emergency strikes cause inconvenience, that may not be reason enough to ban
strikes." Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bargaining in Public Employment,
79 YALE L.J. 805, 846 (1970).
80. 23 N.Y.2d 111, 242 N.E.2d 802 (1968).
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away a substantial portion of the refuse in New York City, have
the power to endanger the health of millions of its inhabit-
ants.. 8
Can it be said that the result of the strikes described by Judge
Keating is any less harsh than that of some public employee strikes? To
the contrary, such strikes definitely endanger the public health, safety
and welfare. It cannot be denied that the private sector provides
countless vital services affecting the health and safety of the public.
Since most states have legislation to handle such emergency situations
in the private sector, it cannot be validly argued that similar legislation
cannot be applied when public employee strikes result in emergencies.
Realizing the need for such legislation, several U.S. Representatives
have introduced three proposals in Congress for a federal law which
would regulate labor relations of all state and local employees.8 2 Each
of these proposals grant state and local employees the right to strike.8 3
The basic purpose behind any strike, public or private, is to apply
pressure on the employer to concede or at least meet the employees
"half-way" at the bargaining table. Realistically speaking, in the ab-
sence of this tool of collective bargaining, collective negotiations are a
meaningless one-sided affair.8 4 Once impasse has been reached and all
the procedures provided by the legislature in the form of fact-finding
panels and mediation boards have been exhausted, the employees have
no other recourse than to remain on the job under those conditions
which the employer wishes to concede. While one solution might be
compulsory arbitration, the implementation of this device has proven
to be inadequate in that it tips the scales too far in the other direction.
"For example, many municipal employers in Michigan have claimed
that the state's compulsory arbitration act for policemen and firemen
has produced arbitrated settlements far in excess of what might have
been produced by traditional collective bargaining." 'S
It follows, therefore, that the only adequate solution to ensure
equality on both sides of the table is the qualified right to strike. As
81. Id. at 134, 242 N.E.2d at 816.
82. For a discussion of these proposals see Erstling, Federal Regulation of Non-Federal Public
Employment, 24 LAB L.J. 739 (1973).
83. Id. at 751-53.
84. Wellington and Winter have formulated the argument:
In the private sector collective bargaining depends on the strike threat and the
occasional strike. It is how deals are made, how collective bargaining works, why
employers agree to terms and conditions of employment better than they origi-
nally offered. Intuition suggests that what is true of the private sector is also true of
the public. Without the strike threat and the strike, the public employee will be in-
transigent; and this intransigence will, in effect, deprive employees of the very
benefits unionization was intended to bring them. Collective bargaining, the argu-
ment goes, will merely be a facade for "collective begging."
Wellington, supra note 79, at 823.
85. Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REV. 885,
892 (1973).
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stated by Pennsylvania's Hickman Commission, the collective bargain-
ing process will be strengthened if this qualified right to strike is
recognized.8 6
Advocates of the no-strike policy seldom take into account the
psychological effect of the strike ban on public employees. It would be
naive to suggest that the employees do not resent this limitation
imposed on them, and that they will continue to work with the same
vigor and enthusiasm once they have been "commanded" back to work.
Notwithstanding a strike is banned and the employees must return to
work, there is nothing to stop the employees from "throwing a wrench
into the works.",
8 7
By developing negotiation processes without providing the tools for
negotiation, legislatures have avoided the question. "In the main, the
statutes have not worked because they merely postpone the eventual
strike confrontation by creating fact-finding commissions or compul-
sory arbitration tribunals in which the employees have no trust."8 8
The problem consists less in the sheer number of strikes in the public
sector than in the results of those strikes. If the strike presents a clear
danger to the public health, safety, and welfare it should not be
allowed. The jurisdictions which allow the strikes have stressed this
point in their enactments. The proposed bill in Maryland is also explicit
on this point.
8 9
Since Pennsylvania's Act 195 is the most controversial of the enact-
ments, a viable analysis of the strike position can be made by evaluating
the results of the strikes in that state. Act 195 initially resulted in
increased stoppages, but is slowly beginning to show the results in-
tended by the legislature. The "growing pains" attendant to any piece
of legislation are beginning to disappear. As of September 24, 1973, 27
teachers' strikes had taken place during the 1973-74 school year. Most
of them, however, were settled quickly and little time was lost by either
teachers or students.9 0 The president of the Pennsylvania State Educa-
tion Association observed:
This trend indicates two things, a greater acceptance on the
part of the school boards of the bargaining processes and the
continued desire on the part of the teachers to go the extra mile
86. GERR No. 251, supra note 48, at E-3.
87. In regard to public school teachers, one commentator suggests:
[Iln situations involving skilled public employees, the public may be harmed more
by slipshod performance than by a temporary suspension of services. Indeed, a de-
lay in the opening of school may be more desirable than an extended period dur-
ing which teaching occurs under judicial coercion.
Comment, Collective Bargaining for Public Employees and the Prevention of Strikes in
the Public Sector, 68 MICH. L. REV. 260, 266 (1969).
88. Lev, Strikes by Government Employees: Problems and Solutions, 57 A.B.A.J. 771, 774
(1971).
89. H.B. 47, Md. Gen. Ass., 1974 Sess., § 115(c).
90. Fewer Stries... Quicker Settlements, VOICE OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION 1 (Sept. 24, 1973).
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to reach a settlement before going on strike. And things are
working out under Act 195 just about as we predicted. As
sophistication on the part of both sides increased, the number
of strikes decreased. 9 1
As a result of the strikes school teachers and other public employes
are receiving the wages and benefits they justifiably deserve. Such
activity is not endangering the public health, safety and welfare, but
rather is finding at the outcome a better educational system, 9 2 and
better public service. Such results can only be reached by sophistication
and open-mindedness at the bargaining table. But even this cannot be
attained until the legislatures become sophisticated enough to allow
such employees the right to strike.
CONCLUSION
To date, the Maryland legislature has only addressed itself to public
employee strikes in one area: that of public school teachers.9 That
statute imposes upon local boards of education the obligation to meet
and negotiate with teachers' associations. Strikes are prohibited under
the statute and penalties are provided for violations.9 4 In lieu of any
other applicable statutes, 9 5 the common law rule is applicable to all
other public employees, the right to strike being prohibited.9 6
Notwithstanding these rules, Maryland has witnessed stoppages in the
public sector. In the years between 1958 and 1966 there were only
91. Id.
92. The Pennsylvania Department of Education, in preparing to meet the teachers' associa-
tions at the bargaining tables, has stated in its guidelines:
[In the maelstrom of the additional activity in which we are about to be in-
volved, there is one very fundamental thing which must be front and center in the
thinking of everyone connected with bargaining in the public schools. This is the
undeniable fact that the end result of all bargaining must be a better education for
a boy or girl in the Commonwealth.
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, A LOOK AT THE PUBLIC EMPLOYE RELATIONS
ACT 195, at 20 (May 1971) (emphasis added).
93. MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, § 160 (1969).
94. The statute provides, inter alia:
Employee organizations shall be prohibited from calling or directing a strike. If
an employee organization designated as exclusive representative shall violate the
provisions hereof, its designation as exclusive representative shall be revoked by
the public school employer, and said employee organization which violates any of
the provisions hereof, shall be ineligible to be designated as exclusive representa-
tive for a period of two (2) years thereafter. If any employee organization violates
the provisions hereof, the public school employer shall refrain from making payroll
deductions for that organization's dues for a period of one (1) year thereafter.
Id. § 160 (1).
95. It should be noted that the City of Baltimore has an ordinance which specifically prohibits
strikes, secondary boycotts and picketing by city employees. BALTIMORE, MD., CITY
CODE art. 1, § 124 (Supp. 1973).
96. 323 F. Supp. 203, 208 (D. Md. 1971).
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three public employee strikes.9 ' These strikes resulted in 1460 idle
man-days and involved 410 workers.9 8 In the next five years, however,
the number of strikes increased to 18, resulting in a loss of 58,010 idle
man-days, and involved 11,710 workers.9"
As the statistics indicate, and as recognized by the 1968 Task
Force,' 00 Maryland is not exempt from the potential threat imposed
by public employees throughout the country. Is there any indication
that the strikes will decline? To the contrary, "an increasing number of
unions and employee associations in public services are reexamining the
use of strikes to resolve contract disputes."' 0 I This was evidenced by
the recent Baltimore City teachers' strike which stopped that city's
schools for four weeks in February and March of 1974.' "2 While one
can only hypothesize as to the underlying factors leading up to that
strike, it can be suggested that the city's reluctance to enter a contract
was partially prompted by the knowledge that the teachers would be
hesitant to take part in an illegal strike.' 03
The time has come when all must realize that public employees
performing essentially the same services as their counterparts in the
private sector cannot be deprived of the right to strike. The expansion
and growth of the government into "non-essential" areas must inevi-
tably be paralleled with the demise of common law thinking.
Initially the number of strikes may increase to bring the public
employee bargaining status up to par with his private sector counter-
part. Eventually, however, the numbers will decline when equality is
restored and when the public bargaining tables attain the sophistication
of private industry negotiations. There should be no doubt that the end
result of these strikes will be better public services for all.
Joseph L. Persico
97. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, 1958-68, REPORT No.
348 at 15-17 (1970).
98. Id.
99. 1967-68 figures: Id.; 1969-70 figures: BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, GOVERNMENT WORK
STOPPAGES, 1960, 1969 and 1970, SUMMARY REPORT 8 (1971); 1971 figures: BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, GOVERNMENT WORK STOPPAGES IN 1971 (March 1973).
100. Although not citing isolated instances, the Task Force did state that Maryland has ex-
perienced work stoppages and disputes involving, among others, teachers, sanitation
workers, firemen, policemen, social workers and laborers. GERR No. 278, at AA-4 n.2.
101. Ross, supra note 59, at 14.
102. See Baltimore Evening Sun, Mar. 5. 1974, at Al, col. 7.
103. BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE art. 1, § 124 (Supp. 1973).
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